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Human Systems Integration (HSI) utilizes a variety of analysis methods to evaluate systems with respect to 
seven key domains: manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, personnel survivability, 
habitability and safety & occupational health. A critical part of the "I" in HSI is the tradeoff analysis where 
system features and attributes are "traded-off" to satisfy constraints on system life cycle cost, performance, 
and development/delivery schedule. Members of this panel will discuss general HSI tradeoff lessons 
learned based on their experiences in support of Naval surface acquisition programs, focusing on the 
mechanics of initiating and completing HSI tradeoff analyses. These experiences include interactions with 
people and hardware/software (e.g., data collection, formatting, processing, etc.), timelines/deadlines to 
complete analyses and make decisions, and any required support activities (e.g., meetings, briefings, etc.). 
Each panelist will share experiences from the perspective of one of three key acquisition positions for HSI: 





The Department of Defense Acquisition System is a 
multilayered process that attempts to simultaneously 
coordinate activities between program management, systems 
engineering, contracting, and logistics. As outlined in the 
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (2008), a Human 
Systems Integration (HSI) plan must be included in the 
acquisition strategy and systems engineering plan for any 
system to address the following seven HSI domains: 
manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, 
habitability, survivability (of personnel), and safety & 
occupational health.  
The ultimate goal of HSI analyses is to ensure that as 
many requirements relative to the seven domains for a system 
(or system of systems) are satisfied within the constraints of 
life cycle cost, performance, and development/delivery 
schedule. However, depending on the requirements and 
constraints, the analysis needs within a particular HSI domain 
or between  domains can be complex and challenging. 
Chapanis (1996) describes a general example of tradeoffs 
in systems engineering as follows: “…suppose Function A can 
be performed faster on Computer System X, but Function B 
can be performed faster on Computer System Y…How do you 
strike a balance between the savings in time versus the cost of 
errors? Does increased operator comfort increase productivity 
and, if it does, how can that be translated into dollar savings? 
Since more highly selected personnel require less training, is it 
better to spend more money on selection or on training?” (p. 
283).  
Consider asking such questions relative to multiple 
systems on a new construction or modification of a U.S. Navy 
ship.  As a true system of systems, a typical ship has 
machinery spaces, combat systems spaces, a flight deck, and 
living quarters. Because of this complexity, a variety of HSI 
tradeoff needs may arise, and are typically context specific.  
But how does one conduct a cross domain tradeoff 
analysis?  What are the elements of the analysis process? 
During this panel discussion, participants will provide lessons 
learned that address the following key questions: 
 
• How does the acquisition phase or maturity of design 
affect the nature and impact of conducting tradeoff 
analyses? 
• What factors precipitate a need for a tradeoff analysis? 
• What factors influence the technical scope of a tradeoff 
analysis? How can this scope vary for different types of 
domain tradeoffs? 
• What kinds of people interactions are needed to conduct a 
tradeoff analysis? 
• What analyses require close collaboration with other 
engineering elements, and how best do you obtain that 
collaboration? 
• What techniques or tools are useful when conducting a 
tradeoff analysis? 
• What are typical implications of tradeoff analyses on 
engineering decisions/activities? What about implications 
on program management decisions/activities? 
• What kinds of engineering and program management 
risks relate to tradeoffs? 
• Which tradeoffs are most challenging? 
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In the area of Defense acquisition, tradeoffs are constantly 
being made, either implicitly or explicitly. A senior decision 
maker, recognizing the high cost of manpower, sets the 
manning requirement for a new ship platform at a nominal 
number. Whether or not it is acknowledged, he has made a 
tradeoff.  In the decision maker’s mind, the trade is between 
cost and manpower – but the tradeoff has far-reaching 
ramifications that will almost certainly affect other HSI 
domains of personnel, training, human factors engineering, 
habitability, survivability (of personnel), and safety & 
occupational health.  
Consider the case in which the manning requirement is set 
at an arbitrarily low number for a ship class. This decision 
affects the performance of the entire system in both direct and 
indirect ways.  The work on the ship, including standing watch 
and maintenance, is fixed – although it varies with ship 
activities and evolutions. With fewer sailors onboard, there are 
fewer bodies available to do this fixed amount of work. 
Consequently, the sailors must work longer hours to 
accomplish the work, resulting in cumulative fatigue and an 
ever-increasing sleep debt.   
While this may seem to be a small problem, the 
downstream effect of the manning decision may be that sailors 
choose not to work on this platform, making retention and 
promotion a challenge. In order to keep sailors on the ship, 
pay bonuses must be offered—offsetting the original cost-
saving effort. The sailors on the under-manned ship may be so 
tired and sleep-deprived that they make mistakes or fail to 
perform the required maintenance, resulting in costly mishaps 
and safety issues. In emergency conditions, such as that 
experienced by the USS Cole, there may not be enough able-
bodied sailors to perform critical tasks such as firefighting, 
resulting in a threat to system and personnel survivability.  
Because manning levels for the ship have been 
minimized, the ship has fewer qualified watchstanders – 
making it ever harder for junior sailors and officers to get the 
training and experience required for qualification and 
promotion. The need to perform multiple jobs (i.e., the ‘hybrid 
sailor’) creates more pressure on training and performance; 
over-tasking of the individual sailor is common.  The resulting 
decline in morale will certainly impact the level of motivation 
and individual sailor performance and will ripple through 
overall system performance.  Ships will fail inspections and 
readiness levels will be compromised, all resulting from a 
simple tradeoff decision to cut back on the number of sailors.   
HSI offers the opportunity for an early exploration of 
decisions such as those described in the previous example.  
Making the implications of tradeoff decisions available for 
decision makers to consider will result in better-informed and 
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The top-level objectives of HSI are optimizing total 
system performance and minimizing total ownership cost.  
The terms minimize and optimize do not translate well into 
requirements documents, so the working-level HSI or domain 
practitioner must establish lower-level objectives to address.  
Success in making a domain tradeoff requires scoping the 
tradeoff to these and other constraints.   
First, the tradeoff needs to fit the program’s 
organizational, contractual, and political framework.  The HSI 
focus on total ownership cost and total system performance is 
common to systems engineering, which illustrates the need for 
tight integration of HSI with systems engineering aspects of 
the program.  The components of the tradeoff – in particular 
the costs incurred and savings realized – need to be within the 
authority of the part of the organization making the tradeoff.  
The tradeoffs that are most likely to succeed are those whose 
costs and benefits are fully within the established systems 
engineering scope or the authority of the Program Manager, 
and all relevant domains must be in concurrence.   
The hierarchy of the Department of the Navy illustrates 
the difficulty in making tradeoffs between acquisition cost and 
manpower, as the responsibilities for acquisition and 
manpower in the Navy reside with separate Assistant 
Secretaries of the Navy. Contractual limitations to be 
considered include (1) the Statement of Work or Work 
Breakdown Structure of the project, and (2) the contractual 
deliverables.  Any significant work or product that needs to be 
traded off – as an addition or a subtraction – needs to be 
aligned with these constraints. 
Second, the tradeoff must be scoped to the right 
timeframe.  Typically, any cost incurred for a tradeoff must be 
recoverable within the near-term funding cycle for a Program 
Manager, which would typically be two or three years.  Also, 
program schedule may not be a variable that can be traded off, 
particularly for ship systems.  For most ship systems, their 
completion or delivery dates are tied to construction or 
overhaul periods for ships, which are not under the control of 
the Program Manager and are unlikely to be altered. The 
financial costs and benefits of HSI may also be associated 
with different timeframes.  Valerdi and Liu (2010) present 
three levels of HSI cost, beginning with the cost to carry out 
HSI as part of systems engineering, which would include the 
cost of defining requirements or conducting a tradeoff 
analysis.  The second level is the cost of satisfying those 
requirements in the design, and the third level is the long-term 
total ownership cost or savings of the earlier HSI investment 
(or lack thereof).  Costs within individual domains can be 
difficult to predict, and differing timeframes only makes these 
costs more difficult to trade off against one another. 
Third, the tradeoff must specifically address a program 
priority.  It will be difficult to illustrate how a tradeoff 
minimizes total ownership cost or optimizes total system 
performance, but it is much more straightforward to tie a 
tradeoff to performance requirements, to manpower and 
personnel constraints, or documented program risks.  
Associating a tradeoff with a program risk is one of the fastest 
ways to get approval because it addresses something of direct 
importance to the Program Manager.  Domains differ in their 
relevant data and areas of interest, meaning that trades have to 
be made in different “units of measure.”  Translating the 
impact in each domain to program priorities improves the 
viability of the tradeoff. 
Finally, making a tradeoff requires relevant supporting 
data.  Since people are inherently the most variable part of the 
total system, different decision makers will have different 
predictions or assumptions about how they will impact 
performance.  The proclivity for armchair performance 
prediction from outside the HSI community can be best 
discouraged by collecting the relevant data or completing the 
relevant analyses.  Performing the analysis work may require a 
specific contractual deliverable.  The results then need to be 
condensed or translated into a format that is relevant at the 
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Although practitioners in the HSI domains have made 
great strides in gaining acceptance into the system acquisition 
process, the role of these practitioners is not often readily 
apparent to the practitioners of more traditional engineering 
and program management disciplines.  In other words, the 
traditional acquisition community is generally aware of the 
requirements to “do HSI” but still often at a loss for the best 
way to integrate this new discipline (or set of disciplines) into 
the process.  Therefore, it is incumbent on the HSI 
practitioners to provide some education to these practitioners 
on the value provided by including HSI considerations into the 
conventional cost, schedule, and performance tradeoff process.   
Unfortunately, two issues arise when trying to provide 
this “education.”   First, hard and fast requirements for HSI are 
still in the beginning stages of development.  Despite support 
for HSI at high levels within the Department of Defense and 
other governmental organizations, the requirements for a 
Program Manager are still somewhat ambiguous.  Program 
Managers know that they are required to fund professionals in 
the domains, but many do not know how to utilize them.  
Therefore, an assertion that HSI has value to the program 
meeting a higher level requirement is difficult to defend if the 
program is technically meeting the requirement simply by 
funding HSI practitioners.   
Second, because HSI is still in its infancy, there are few, 
if any, major acquisition programs that have fully 
implemented HSI considerations into the acquisition 
tradespace and progressed into operations and sustainment of 
the designed systems.  The paucity of data from programs that 
have “walked the talk” limits the ability to study its impact 
across the lifecycle.  For this reason, an assertion that HSI has 
value cannot easily be communicated in terms of returns on 
investment from cost, schedule, or performance standpoints, 
precisely the language that is important to a Program 
Manager.   
Since HSI requirements are not often clear and there is 
scarce data on its return on investment, HSI practitioners need 
to educate traditional acquisition professionals through 
actively participating during the systems engineering process.  
This means educating themselves on the factors the 
disciplines, both internal and external to HSI, are considering.  
For example, for many Navy assets (ships, aircraft, etc), a key 
consideration is overall weight, which adds to fuel costs, and 
structural engineering, and material costs.  Therefore, a human 
factors, habitability, training, or manpower “solution” that 
adds weight (cost) can be a difficult challenge unless it can be 
justified by a large performance payoff. 
Knowing the performance requirements, and whether or 
not the program is on a path to meet them, can provide 
leverage to the argument for the HSI solution.  Since cost is 
often the most important consideration, a “solution” couched 
in terms of a reasonable prediction of increased performance 
that does not increase acquisition cost or schedule is perhaps 
the most powerful argument.  The point is that if the HSI 
practitioner understands the constraints placed on the 
individual on the other side of the tradeoff discussion (e.g., a 
weight limitation), an HSI solution can be developed that 
recognizes that constraint as a limiting factor.  Traditional 
systems engineering tradeoffs between such disciplines as 
hardware and software engineering are performed in this way.  
Participation in this same process by HSI practitioners makes 
the job a little more challenging but it is the essence of the 
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There are actually two layers of HSI Tradeoff Analyses: 
1) within the domains of HSI and 2) between the Human, 
Hardware and Software systems. The Navy’s HSI community 
has successfully performed tradeoff analyses across the 
domains (for example, trading workflow complexity with 
personnel selection), and has been integral to some 
system/subsystem tradeoffs. But often, the success of 
implementing the results of tradeoff analyses requires the use 
of two fundamental skills to successfully implement tradeoffs: 
communication and compromise.  
Communication involves the imparting or interchange of 
thoughts, opinions, or information by speech, writing, or signs. 
The real impacts to system design occur around the table 
where all players are participating – and communicating. As is 
often stated, the Program Manager’s concerns revolve around 
cost, schedule and performance (order of importance may 
vary). The Human Systems Engineer is, at the end of the day, 
a Systems Engineer, because HSI is an integral part of the 
systems engineering process used in the acquisitions 
(Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2, 2008). Therefore, 
the Human Systems Engineer must be able to translate and 
communicate the value of human performance design options 
that support operational requirements and user needs into 
metrics that the Program Manager and other members of the 
system engineering team will understand.  
Two different analyses on two different ship designs in 
the recent past illustrate the success – and failure – of 
successfully engaging the program leadership. In the first 
example, naval architects argued against a two-story high Ship 
Command Center on the basis of structural integrity and 
constructability. Although human performance analysis and 
other design experience showed the value in increasing 
situational awareness, communication and execution, this had 
to be explained in terms Mission Performance, which included 
time to execute, and the difficulty to achieve the same level of 
performance in a single story design option. By understanding 
the naval architect’s problem and design space, the HSI team 
was able to successfully present (and win) the argument for a 
two story command center.  
The second example involved a study looking at reducing 
workload through machinery space design with the goal of 
reducing manning. The difficulty in translating workload to 
manpower to sailor billets to dollars rendered an answer that 
leadership just couldn’t grasp on a single PowerPoint slide. 
The analysis was good, the communication was not, and no 
impact was made to the program. 
Compromise (a settlement of differences by mutual 
concessions) is another skill necessary to impact design. The 
key objectives are Total System Performance and Total 
Ownership Cost across the hardware, software, and people, 
including user preferences. US Navy Ship and Ship systems 
(propulsion, ship control, weapon systems) have key 
parameters, including weight, balance, displacement and 
power. Recognizing that some things are indeed negotiable, 
and knowing which parameters absolutely cannot be 
compromised, allows the Human System Engineer to 
collaboratively engage the rest of the design team to meet 
these objectives. This may include ‘compromise’ on the 
analysis itself: no program has enough money to do everything 
desired, and the successful engineer will craft an effective 
analysis that answers the questions and meets cost and 
temporal constraints.  
For example, in a recent ship design, one organization 
proposed a high fidelity simulation of a command center to 
determine the layout of people and equipment. The program 
had neither the consoles (final design has just been settled, but 
nothing manufactured) nor the software (ship construction 
requires a very early lead time, often before software systems 
are complete or designed). Another organization proposed a 
lower fidelity option to focus on the problem at hand: 
optimizing the layout of people and equipment based on 
requirements and anticipated functionality. The low fidelity 
option was funded, and made significant contributions to the 
final approved layout of the command center. Would the high 
fidelity option have provided better analysis? Absolutely, but 
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